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Abstract
Adversarial training is a popular method to give neural nets robustness against adversarial
perturbations. In practice adversarial training leads to low robust training loss. However, a
rigorous explanation for why this happens under natural conditions is still missing. Recently
a convergence theory for standard (non-adversarial) training was developed by various groups
for very over-parametrized nets. It is unclear how to extend these results to adversarial training
because of the min-max objective. Recently, a first step towards this direction was made by Gao
et al. [2019] using tools from online learning, but they require the width of the net and the
running time to be exponential in input dimension d, and they consider an activation function
that is not used in practice. Our work proves convergence to low robust training loss for
polynomial width and running time, instead of exponential, under natural assumptions and with
ReLU activation. Key element of our proof is showing that ReLU networks near initialization
can approximate the step function, which may be of independent interest.
∗Equal contribution
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1 Introduction
Deep neural networks trained by gradient based methods tend to change their answer (incorrectly)
after small adversarial perturbations in inputs Szegedy et al. [2013]. Much effort has been spent
to make deep nets resistant to such perturbations but adversarial training with a natural min-max
objective Madry et al. [2018] stands out as one of the most effective approaches according to Carlini
and Wagner [2017], Athalye et al. [2018].
One interpretation of the min-max formulation is a certain two-player game between a neural
network learner and an adversary who is allowed to perturb the input within certain constraints.
In each round, the adversary generates new adversarial examples against the current network, on
which the learner takes a gradient step to decrease its prediction loss in response (see Algorithm 1).
It is empirically observed that, when the neural network is initialized randomly, this training
algorithm is efficient and computes a reasonably sized neural net that is robust on (at least) the
training examples [Madry et al., 2018]. We’re interested in theoretical understanding of this phe-
nomenon: Why does adversarial training efficiently find a feasibly sized neural net to fit training data
robustly? In the last couple of years, a convergence theory has been developed for non-adversarial
training: it explains the ability of gradient descent to achieve small training loss, provided the neural
nets are fairly over-parametrized. But it is quite unclear whether similar analysis can be applied
to adversarial training setting where the inputs are perturbed. Furthermore, while the algorithm
is reminiscent of well-studied no-regret dynamics for finding equilibria in two-player zero-sum con-
vex/concave games [Hazan et al., 2016], here the game value is training loss, and hence non-convex.
Thus it is unclear if training leads to small robust training loss.
A study of such issues was initiated in Gao et al. [2019]. For two-layer nets with quadratic
ReLU activation1 they were able to show that if input is in Rd then training can achieve robust
loss at most  provided the net’s width is (1/)Ω(d) (the number of required iterations is also that
large)2. This is very extreme over-parametrization, and this curse of dimensionality is inherent to
their argument. They left as an open problem the possibility to improve the width requirement,
which is the theme of our paper.
Our contributions: Under a standard and natural assumption that training data are well-
separated with respect to the magnitude of the adversarial perturbations (also verified for popular
datasets in Figure 1) we show the following:
• That there exists a two-layer ReLU neural network with width poly (d, n/) near Gaussian
random initialization that achieves  robust training loss.
• That starting from Gaussian random initialization, standard adversarial training (Algorithm 1)
converges to such a network in poly (d, n/) iterations.
• New result in approximation theory, specifically the existence of a good approximation to
the step function by a polynomially wide two-layer ReLU network with weights close to the
standard gaussian initialization. Such approximation result may be of further use in the
emerging theory of over-parameterized nets.
Paper structure. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give an overview of the
related works. In section 3, we present our notation, the adversarial training algorithm, the separa-
1This is the activation function (ReLU(x))2.
2These bounds appear in Corollary C.1 in their paper.
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bility condition and we argue why the training examples being well-separated is a natural assump-
tion. In section 4, we formally state our main result and in section 5 we give an overview of its
proof. In section 6 we elaborate more on the core part of the proof, which is the existence of a net
close to initialization that robustly fits the training data.
2 Related Works
Adversarial examples and defense. The seminal paper Szegedy et al. [2013] discovered the
existence of adversarial examples. Since its discovery, numerous defense methods have been proposed
to make neural nets robust to perturbations constrained in a ball with respect to a certain norm
(e.g. `2, `∞). These methods span an extremely wide spectrum including certification [Raghunathan
et al., 2018, Wong and Kolter, 2017], input transformation [Buckman et al., 2018, Guo et al., 2017],
randomization [Xie et al., 2017], adversarial training Madry et al. [2018], etc. Recent studies on
evaluating the effectiveness of the aforementioned defenses by Carlini and Wagner [2017], Athalye
et al. [2018] reveals that adversarial training dominates the others. One empirical observation made
in Madry et al. [2018] is that adversarial training can always make wide nets achieve small robust
training loss.
Convergence via over-parameterization. Recently, there has been a tremendous progress in
understanding the "small training loss" phenomenon in standard (non-adversarial) training [Li and
Liang, 2018, Du et al., 2019b, Allen-Zhu et al., 2019b,c, Du et al., 2019a, Arora et al., 2019b,a, Song
and Yang, 2019, Zou et al., 2018, Oymak and Soltanolkotabi, 2019]. A convergence theory has been
developed to show that, when randomly initialized, gradient descent and stochastic gradient descent
converge to small training loss in polynomially many iterations when the network has polynomial
width in terms of the number of training examples. These papers studied over-paramterized neural
networks in the neural tangent kernel (NTK) regime [Jacot et al., 2018].
Convergence of adversarial training. There is a growing interest in analyzing convergence
properties of adversarial training. Gao et al. [2019] made a first attempt towards extending the
aforementioned results in standard training to adversarial training. Like previous works on the
convergence of (non-adversasrial) gradient descent for over-parameterized neural networks, this work
also considered the NTK regime. First of all, they prove that adversarial training with an artificial
projection step always finds a multi-layer ReLU net that is -optimal within the neighborhood
near initialization, but the optimal robust loss could be large. Secondly, for two-layer quadratic
ReLU net, they managed to prove that small adversarial loss will be achieved, but crucially the
required width and running time are (1/)Ω(d). Their argument suffers the curse of dimensionality,
because it relies on the universality of the induced Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (induced by
NTK) followed by a random feature approximation. In contrast, we take a closer look on how to
approximate a robust classifier with ReLU networks near their initialization using techniques from
polynomial approximation and manage to overcome this problem. In addition, our convergence
analysis applies to ReLU activated nets without additional projection steps.
Polynomial approximation. A key technique in our proof is a polynomial approximation to the
step function on interval [−1,−η] ∪ [η, 1] which has been an important subject [Allen-Zhu and Li,
2017, Frostig et al., 2016, Eremenko and Yuditskii, 2006]. For -uniform approximation, Frostig
et al. [2016] constructed a polynomial with degree Θ˜ (1/η2) and further proved the existence of a
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Θ˜ (1/η)-degree polynomial3 but without algorithmic construction, which was done by Allen-Zhu and
Li [2017]. Interestingly, a nearly matching lower bound on the degree had been shown by Eremenko
and Yuditskii [2006] much prior to these constructions.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notations
For a vector x, we use ‖x‖p to denote its `p norm, and we are mostly concerned with p = 1, 2, or
∞ in this paper.
For a matrix W ∈ Rd×m, we use W> to denote the transpose of W , we use ‖W‖F , ‖W‖1 and
‖W‖ to denote its Frobenius norm, entry-wise `1 norm, and spectral norm respectively. We define
‖W‖2,∞ = maxj∈[d] ‖Wj‖2, and ‖W‖2,1 =
∑d
j=1 ‖Wj‖2, where Wj is the j-th column of W , for
each j ∈ [m]. We use N (µ,Σ) to denote Gaussian distribution with mean µ and covariance Σ. We
denote by σ(·) the ReLU function σ(z) = max{z, 0} and by 1{E} the indicator function for an
event E.
3.2 Two-layer ReLU network
We consider a two-layer ReLU activated neural network with m neurons in the hidden layer:
f(x) =
m∑
r=1
arσ (〈Wr, x〉+ br) (1)
where W = (W1, . . . ,Wm) ∈ Rd×m is the hidden weight matrix, b = (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ Rm is the bias
vector, and a = (a1, . . . , am) ∈ Rm is the output weight vector. We use F to denote this function
class. During adversarial training, we only update W and keep a and b at initialization values. For
this reason, we write the network as fW (x).
We have n training data S = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} ⊆ Rd × R. We make some standard
assumptions about the training set. Without loss of generality, we assume that for all i ∈ [n],
‖xi‖2 = 1 and the last coordinate xi,d = 1/2 4. For this reason, we define the set X := {x ∈ Rd :
‖x‖2 = 1, xd = 1/2}. We also assume for simplicity that for all i ∈ [n], |yi| ≤ 1.
The initialization of a,W, b is a(0),W (0), b(0).
• The entries of W (0) and b(0) are iid random Gaussians from N (0, 1m).
• The entries of a(0) are iid with distribution unif
({
− 1
m1/3
,+ 1
m1/3
})
. 5
3.3 Adversary and robust loss
To evaluate the neural nets, we consider a loss function of the following type.
Definition 3.1 (Lipschitz convex regression loss). A loss function ` : R × R → R is a Lipschitz
convex regression loss if it satisfies the following properties: convex in the first argument, non-
negative, 1−Lipshcitz and for all y ∈ R, `(y, y) = 0.
3Θ˜(·) excludes logarithmic factors.
41/2 can be padded to the last coordinate, ‖xi‖2 = 1 can always be ensured from ‖xi‖2 ≤ 1 by padding
√
1− ‖x‖22.
5The choice of m1/3 at the denominator is inessential. For technical reasons we need the distribution to be
unif
({− 1
mc
,+ 1
mc
})
for some Ω(1) ≤ c ≤ 1/3.
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We remark the choice of loss is for simplicity of technical presentation, following the convention
in previous works Gao et al. [2019], Allen-Zhu et al. [2019a].
For a vector z ∈ Rd and ρ > 0, let B2(z, ρ) := {x ∈ Rd : ‖x− z‖2 ≤ ρ} ∩ X . Now we define the
adversarial model studied in this paper.
Definition 3.2 (ρ-Bounded adversary). An adversary A : X ×R×F → X is ρ-bounded for ρ > 0
if they satisfy
A(x, y, f) ∈ B2(x, ρ)
We use A∗ to denote the worst-case ρ-bounded adversary for loss function `, which is defined as
A∗(x, y, f) := argmax
x˜∈B2(x,ρ)
`(f(x˜), y)
With a slight abuse of notation, we use A(S, f) := {(A(xi, yi, f), yi)}ni=1 to denote the adversarial
dataset generated by A against a given neural net f .
We now define the robust loss of f in terms of its prediction loss on the examples generated by
an adversary.
Definition 3.3 (Training loss and its robust version). Given a training set S of n examples, the
standard training loss of a neural net f is defined as L(f, S) := 1n
∑n
i=1 ` (f(xi), yi). Against a
ρ-bounded adversary A, we define the robust training loss w.r.t. A as
LA(f) := L(f,A(S, f)) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
` (f(A(xi, yi, f)), yi)
Furthermore, we define analogously the worst-case robust training loss as
LA∗(f) := L(f,A∗(S, f)) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
max
x˜i∈B2(xi,ρ)
` (f(x˜i), yi)
3.4 Well-separated training sets
Training set being well-separated is a standard assumption in over-parametrization literature. Here
we require a slightly stronger notion since we are dealing with adversarial perturbations.
Definition 3.4 (γ-separability). We say a training set S is γ-separable with respect to a ρ-bounded
adversary, if for all i 6= j ∈ [n], ‖xi − xj‖2 ≥ δ and γ ≤ δ(δ − 2ρ).
Our results imply that the required width is polynomial for Ω(1)-separable training sets. To
see why this is a reasonable assumption, δ ≈ √3/2 if x’s are drawn from the uniform distribution
on X and d is large, while ρ is usually at most 1/20 in practice [Guo et al., 2017]. In Figure 1 we
show that on CIFAR-10, other than probably a very small fraction of examples, all the others do
not have too small minimum distance from any example.6
3.5 Adversarial training algorithm
The adversarial training of a neural net fW against an adversary A can be captured as the following
intertwining dynamics. In the inner loop, the adversary generates adversarial examples against the
current neural net. In the outer loop, a gradient descent step is taken on the neural net’s parameter
to decrease its prediction loss on the fresh adversarial examples.
6One can always exclude this small fraction from the training set and then suffer this fraction at the final robust
0-1 loss.
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Figure 1: Distribution of δi’s of randomly sampled 500 points in CIFAR-10 training set, where δi is
the smallest `2 distance between data point xi and any other point in the training set.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial training
Input: Training set S = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}, Adversary A, learning rate η, initialization
a(0),W (0), b(0).
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
S(t) := ∅
for i = 1 to n do
x˜
(t)
i = A(xi, yi, fW (t))
S(t) = S(t) ∪ (x˜(t)i , yi)
end for
W (t+1) = W (t) − η · ∇WL(fW (t) , S(t)).
end for
Output: {W (t)}Tt=1
Remark. The gradient computation ∇WL(fW (t) , S(t)) is undertaken pretending as if S(t) was in-
dependent from W (t), i.e., without differentiating through A.
4 Main Result
We now formally present our main theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that the training set S is γ-separable, for some γ > 0. Then, for all
 ∈ (0, 1), there exist
M0 = poly
(
d,
(n

)1/γ)
and R = poly
((n

)1/γ)
such that for every m ≥ M0, with probability at least 1 − exp
(−Ω (m1/3)) over the choice of
a(0),W (0), b(0), if we run adversarial training 1 with hyper-parameters
T = Θ(−2R2) and η = Θ(m−1/3)
then the output weights
(
W (t)
)T
t=1
satisfy
min
t∈[T ]
LA (fW (t)) ≤ 
5
5 Proof Overview
Pseudo-network
The key property used in all recent papers that analyze gradient descent for over-parameterized
neural nets is that if a network fW (x) =
∑m
r=1 a
(0)
r σ
(
〈Wr, x〉+ b(0)r
)
is very over-parameterized
and its weights are close to initialization, then it is well-approximated by its corresponding pseudo-
network :
gW (x) =
m∑
r=1
a(0)r 〈Wr −W (0)r , x〉1
{
〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0
}
However, the approximation result used for standard training is insufficient for our purposes, because
here we deal with adversarial perturbations and in order to argue that during adversarial training
the network behaves essentially as a pseudo-network, we need an approximation guarantee that
holds uniformly over all X . More specifically, in these works, it is proven that for any fixed input
x, with probability at least 1 − e− poly(logm), for W close to the initialization, |fW (x) − gW (x)| is
small. But, with this probability bound, in order to argue that supx∈X |fW (x)− gW (x)| is small via
-net arguments, one needs m ≥ exp(Ω(d)). In this work, we show that the guarantee for fixed x
actually holds with much higher probability: 1− exp(−Ω(m1/3)). The fact that this approximation
fails with exponentially small probability, enables us to take a union bound over a very fine-grained
1
poly(m) -net of X , and even though it has cardinality exp(O(d logm)), the widthm we need to control
the overall probability is still polynomial in d. The final step is to bound the stability of f and g
under small perturbations, even though g is not Lipschitz continuous.
Theorem 5.1. Let R ≥ 1. For all m ≥ poly(d), with probability at least 1 − exp(−Ω(m1/3)) over
the choice of a(0),W (0), b(0), for all W ∈ Rd×m such that ‖W −W (0)‖2,∞ ≤ Rm2/3 ,
sup
x∈X
|fW (x)− gW (x)| ≤ O
(
R2
m1/6
)
We give the proof of Theorem 5.1 at the Appendix A.1.
Online convex optimization view
The adversarial training algorithm fits the framework of online gradient descent (OGD): at each
step t,
1. The adversary chooses the loss function Lt(W ) = L
(
fW (t) , S
(t)
)
.
2. The learner incurs the cost Lt(W (t)) and updates W (t+1) = W (t) − η∇WLt(W (t)).
Online gradient descent comes with regret guarantees, when the loss functions are convex [Hazan,
2016], but in our case they are not. However, it can be shown that during adversarial training, the
weights stay near initialization, which implies that the net behaves like a pseudo-net. Moreover,
pseudo-net is linear in W and so the regret guarantee holds, up to a small approximation error.
Notably, the regret is with respect to the best net in hindsight, that is also close to initialization.
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Theorem 5.2. For all  ∈ (0, 1), R ≥ 1, there exists an M = poly (n,R, 1 ), such that for every
m ≥ M , with probability at least 1 − exp (−Ω (m1/3)) over the choice of a(0),W (0), b(0), if we run
Algorithm 1 with hyper-parameters
T = Θ(−2R2) and η = Θ(m−1/3)
then for every W ∗ such that ‖W ∗ −W (0)‖2,∞ ≤ Rm2/3 , the output weights
(
W (t)
)T
t=1
satisfy
1
T
T∑
t=1
LA (fW (t)) ≤ LA∗ (fW ∗) + 
Note that while in the LHS of the guarantee we have the robust losses w.r.t. A, in the RHS we
have the worst-case robust loss. We give the proof of Theorem 5.2 at the Appendix A.2.
The connection with OCO was first made in Gao et al. [2019]. However, they prove the above
result for the case of quadratic ReLU activation. For the classical ReLU, they need to enforce the
closeness to the initialization during training via a projection step, that is not used in practice.
Existence of robust network near initialization
What is left to do to prove Theorem 4.1 is to show the existence of a network fW ∗ that is close to
initialization and the worst-case robust loss LA∗(fW ∗) is small. Gao et al. [2019] required m to be
at least
(
1

)Ω(d) to prove this statement. Our main result is the proof of existence of such network
with width at most poly
(
d,
(
n

)1/γ). Formally, for a ρ-bounded adversary and γ-separable training
set, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3. For all  ∈ (0, 1), there exists
M0 = poly
(
d,
(n

)1/γ)
and R = poly
((n

)1/γ)
such that for every m ≥ M0, with probability at least 1 − exp
(−Ω (m1/3)) over the choice of
a(0),W (0), b(0), there exists W ∗ ∈ Rd×m such that ‖W ∗ −W (0)‖2,∞ ≤ Rm2/3 and
LA∗ (fW ∗) ≤ 
The proof of Theorem 5.3 has three steps:
• We show that there is a function f∗ : X → R that has "low complexity" and for all datapoints
(xi, yi) and perturbed inputs x˜i ∈ B2(xi, r), f∗(x˜i) ≈ yi. More specifically, this function will
have the form
f∗(x) =
n∑
i=1
yiq(〈xi, x〉)
where q is a low-degree polynomial approximating a step function that is 1 for 〈xi, x〉 ≈ 1
and 0 otherwise. The existence of such a low-degree polynomial is proven using tools from
approximation theory that appear in Sachdeva et al. [2014], Frostig et al. [2016].
• We show that since f∗ has "low complexity", there exists a pseudo-network gW ∗ that is close
to initialization, has polynomial width (for γ = Ω(1)), and gW ∗ ≈ f∗.
• We use Theorem 5.1 to show that for the real network fW ∗ we have fW ∗ ≈ gW ∗ .
We provide a sketch of the implementation of these three steps in section 6.
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6 Proof of Theorem 5.3
We first provide the definition of a complexity measure for polynomials, following Allen-Zhu et al.
[2019a]. Note that the definitions of that paper also have an input parameter R. In this work, we
set that R to be 1.
Definition 6.1. Let c > 1 denote a sufficiently large constant. For any degree-k univariate polyno-
mial φ(z) =
∑k
j=0 αjz
j, and parameter 1 > 0, we define the following two measures of complexity
C(φ, 1) :=
k∑
j=0
cj · (1 + (
√
ln(1/1)/j)
j) · |αj |
C(φ) := c ·
k∑
j=0
(j + 1)1.75|αj |
6.1 Robust fitting with polynomials
In this section we show that the fact that the points xi in the training set have pairwise `2 distance
at least δ and 1/δ is not too large implies that there is a function f∗ that has "low complexity" and
robustly fits the training set:
∀i ∈ [n], x˜i ∈ B2(xi, ρ), f∗(x˜i) ≈ yi
Formally, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6.2. Let D = 24γ ln
(
48n
)
. There exists a polynomial q : R → R with degree at most D,
size of coefficients at most O(γ−126D), such that for all j ∈ [n] and x˜j ∈ B2(xj , ρ),∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
yi · q(〈xi, x˜j〉)− yi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3 .
Given the polynomial q of the lemma, we will write f∗(x) :=
∑n
i=1 yi · q(〈xi, x〉). To prove
Lemma 6.2, we first show how to approximate the step function via a polynomial. More specifically,
the plan is this polynomial to take as input the inner product of two unit vectors u, v and its output
to be close to {
1, if ‖u− v‖2 ≤ ρ;
0, if ‖u− v‖2 ≥ δ − ρ.
Note that since these are unit vectors, ‖u − v‖2 ≤ ρ is equivalent to 〈u, v〉 ≥ 1 − ρ2/2, and
‖u− v‖2 ≥ δ − ρ is equivalent to 〈u, v〉 ≤ 1− (δ − ρ)2/2. We prove the following claim.
Claim 6.3. Let 1 ∈ (0, 1) and D = 24γ ln
(
16
1
)
. Then, there exists a univariate polynomial q1(z)
with degree at most D and size of coefficients at most O(γ−126D), such that
1. ∀z ∈ [1− ρ2/2, 1], |q1(z)− 1| ≤ 1.
2. ∀z ∈ [−1, 1− (δ − ρ)2/2), |q1(z)| ≤ 1.
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Proof. For α ∈ [−1, 1], we define
stepα(z) =

0, if − 1 ≤ z < α
1/2, if z = α
1, if α < z ≤ 1
sgn(z) =

−1, if − 1 ≤ z < 0
0, if z = 0
1, if 0 < z ≤ 1
Note that stepα(z) =
1
2(sgn(z − α) + 1). We need a polynomial approximation result of the sgn
function, from Frostig et al. [2016].
Lemma 6.4 (Lemma 5.5 from Frostig et al. [2016]). Let 1, η ∈ (0, 1) and D = 3η ln 2η1 . Then,
there exists a univariate polynomial p1(z) =
∑k
j=0 αjz
j with degree k ≤ D and |αj | ≤ 24D, that is
an 1-approximation of the sgn function in [−1, 1] \ (−η, η), meaning that
1. ∀z ∈ [η, 1], |p1(z)− 1| ≤ 1.
2. ∀z ∈ [−1,−η], |p1(z) + 1| ≤ 1.
Frostig et al. [2016] describe how to construct the above polynomial and bound its degree, but
do not present a bound on its coefficients. We prove Lemma 6.4 in Appendix A.4.
We can now approximate the step function by the polynomial
q1(z) =
p1(2(z − α)) + 1
2
. (2)
Because of the lemma and the connection between the sgn and the stepα functions, we get that
∀z ∈ [−2 + α, 2 + α] \ [α− 2η, α+ 2η],
|q1(z)− stepα(z)| ≤ 1/2.
Observe that q1 also has degree k and if A = maxj{|αj |}, then the coefficient of zj in q1 has size
at most 2k−1A
∑k
i=j
(
i
j
)|α|i−j + 1/2 ≤ 22k−1A1−α + 1/2
≤ 26D−11−α + 1/2 . Setting
η = δ(δ − 2ρ)/8 ≤ γ/8 and α = 1− ρ
2
2
− 2η
finishes the proof.
To finish the proof of Lemma 6.2, let q be the polynomial that we get from Claim 6.3, by setting
1 = /(3n). Let f∗(x) =
∑n
i=1 yiq(〈xi, x〉). For all i, j ∈ [n], i 6= j and x˜i ∈ B2(xi, ρ), we have
‖xj − x˜i‖2 ≥ δ − ρ. Thus, from Claim 6.3 we have |q(〈xj , x˜i〉)|, |q(〈xi, x˜i〉)− 1| ≤ /(3n).
|f∗(x˜i)− yi| ≤ |yi||1− q(〈xi, x˜i〉)|+
∑
j 6=i
|yj ||q(〈xj , x˜i〉)|
≤ /(3n) + (n− 1)/(3n)
≤ /3
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6.2 Pseudo-Network Approximates f ∗
We prove that we can use a pseudo-network with width poly
(
d,
(
n

)1/γ) to approximate f∗, uni-
formly over X .
Lemma 6.5. For all  ∈ (0, 1), there exist
M = poly
(
d,
(n

)1/γ)
and R = poly
((n

)1/γ)
such that form ≥M , with probability at least 1−exp
(
−Ω
(√
m/n
))
over the choice of a(0),W (0), b(0),
there exists there exists a W ∗ ∈ Rd×m such that ‖W ∗ −W (0)‖2,∞ ≤ Rm2/3 and
sup
x∈X
|gW ∗(x)− f∗(x)| ≤ /3
Allen-Zhu et al. [2019a] prove a similar but weaker guarantee, by approximating f∗ using a
pseudo-network, in expectation. In other words, they show that for some data distribution D,
Ex∼D [|gW ∗(x)− f∗(x)|] is small, for some pseudo-network gW ∗ close to initialization. As we men-
tioned previously, dealing with the average case is not enough and we need a uniform approximation
guarantee, since we account for adversarial perturbations of the inputs.
We give here a proof sketch for Lemma 6.5 and the full proof at the Appendix A.5. We use a
technical result from Allen-Zhu et al. [2019a]. Suppose that for a given unit vector w∗ ∈ Rd and a
univariate polynomial φ, we want to approximate the function of a unit vector x given by φ(〈w∗, x〉),
via a linear combination of random ReLU features. Intuitively, their result says that if φ has low
complexity, then the weights of this linear combination can be small.
Lemma 6.6 (Lemma 6.2 from Allen-Zhu et al. [2019a]). For every univariate polynomial φ : R→ R,
for every 2 ∈ (0, 1/C(φ)), there exists a function h : R2 → [−C(φ, 2),C(φ, 2)] such that for all
w∗, x ∈ Rd with ‖w∗‖2 = ‖x‖2 = 1, we have
∣∣∣ E
u∼N (0,Id),β∼N (0,1)
[1{〈u, x〉+ β ≥ 0} h(〈w∗, u〉, β)]− φ(〈w∗, x〉)
∣∣∣ ≤ 2
The above lemma implies f∗ can be approximated by an "infinite" pseudo-network. We use
concentration bounds to argue that there exists a pseudo-network gW ∗ with width poly
(
d,
(
n

)1/γ),
such that for any fixed input x ∈ X , with probability at least 1−exp(−Ω(√m/n)), gW ∗(x) ≈ f∗(x).
We conclude the argument via a union bound over a 1poly(m) -net of X and a perturbation analysis
for g, similarly to the proof of Theorem 5.1.
6.3 Putting it all together
We will use Lemmas 6.2, 6.5 and Theorem 5.1 to prove Theorem 5.3. From Lemma 6.2 we get f∗.
From Lemma 6.5 we get theM , R andW ∗ and combining with Theorem 5.1, we have that as long as
m ≥ max{poly(d),M}, with probability at least p := 1−exp(−Ω(√m/n))−exp(−Ω(−m1/3)), there
exists a W ∗ ∈ Rd×m such that ‖W ∗ −W (0)‖2,∞ ≤ Rm2/3 and for all x ∈ X , |gW ∗(x) − f∗(x)| ≤ /3
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and |fW ∗(x)− gW ∗(x)| ≤ O
(
R2
m1/6
)
. Thus, for all i ∈ [n], x˜i ∈ B(xi, ρ),
`(fW ∗(x˜i), yi) ≤ |fW ∗(x˜i)− yi|
≤ |f∗(x˜i)− yi|+ |gW ∗(x˜i)− f∗(x˜i)|+ |fW ∗(x˜i)− gW ∗(x˜i)|
≤ 2
3
+O
(
R2
m1/6
)
≤ 
since m ≥ poly
(
d,
(
n

)1/γ), for a large enough polynomial. Thus, we have that LA∗(f∗) ≤ . As
for the bound on the probability of success p, since m ≥ n3 (for large enough polynomial in the
lower bound for m), we get p ≥ 1− exp(−Ω(−m1/3)).
7 Conclusion and discussion
We have shown that under a natural separability assumption on the training data, adversarial
training on polynomially wide two-layer ReLU networks always converges in polynomial time to
small robust training loss, significantly improving previous results. This may serve as an explanation
for small loss achieved by adversarial training in practice. Central in our proof is an explicit
construction of a robust net near initialization, utilizing ideas from polynomial approximation.
As a future direction, it would be nice to improve the current exponential in 1/γ width require-
ment to polynomial. Ideally, the width requirement would fall back to poly(1/γ) as in standard
(non-adversarial) training setting when the perturbation radius ρ approaches zero, which is missing
in our construction. We believe it may require a better understanding of the expressivity of over-
parameterized nets. Furthermore, a natural next step is to extend our results to multi-layer ReLU
networks.
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A Appendix
For functions f, g : X → R, we define
‖f − g‖∞ = sup
x∈X
|f(x)− g(x)| (3)
A.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof. Let W ∈ Rd×m, ‖W −W (0)‖2,∞ ≤ Rm2/3 , that is arbitrarily correlated with the initialization
a(0),W (0), b(0). It suffices to bound ‖fW −gW ‖∞, where ‖ ·‖∞ is defined in 3. From now on we work
with thisW and we write f, g for fW , gW . Also, let ∆Wr = Wr−W (0)r , I(0)x,r = 1{〈W (0)r , x〉+b(0)r ≥ 0}
and Ix,r = 1{〈W (0)r + ∆Wr, x〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0}. So, we write
f(x) =
m∑
r=1
a(0)r
(
〈W (0)r + ∆Wr, x〉+ b(0)r
)
Ix,r
g(x) =
m∑
r=1
a(0)r 〈∆Wr, x〉I(0)x,r
We prove an elementary anti-concentration property of the Gaussian distribution.
Claim A.1. Let u ∼ N (0, Id) and β ∼ N (0, 1), which are independent. For all x ∈ X and t ≥ 0,
Pr[|〈u, x〉+ β| ≤ t] = O(t).
Proof. We fix x and t and we have that 〈u, x〉+ β ∼ N (0, 2). Moreover,
Pr
z∼N (0,2)
[
|z| ≤ t
]
=
∫ t
−t
1√
2pi
e−z
2/4dz ≤
√
2
pi
t
For all x ∈ X , r ∈ [m] and t ∈ R+, we define
Λr(x, t) := 1
{
|〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r | ≤ t
}
.
and observe that from Claim A.1, after scaling by
√
m, we have that Pr[Λr(x, t) = 1] ≤ O(t
√
m).
We will prove that for every fixed x ∈ X , with high probability, |f(x)− g(x)| is small.
Lemma A.2. For all x ∈ X , with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m1/3)),
|f(x)− g(x)| ≤ O(R2/m1/6) (4)
Proof. Let Ar := 1{Ix,r 6= I(0)x,r}. We bound the size of
∑m
r=1Ar with the following claim.
Claim A.3. For all x ∈ X ,with probability at least 1− exp (−Ω (m5/6)),
m∑
r=1
Ar ≤ O(R ·m5/6)
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Proof. We fix an x ∈ X . Since ‖x‖2 = 1 and ‖∆W‖2,∞ ≤ R/m2/3, we have that
Ar ≤ 1
{
|〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r | ≤ ‖∆Wr‖2
}
≤ Λr(x,R/m2/3).
But, as we mentioned previously, gaussian anti-concentration implies that
Pr
[
Λr(x,R/m
2/3) = 1
]
≤ O(R/m1/6)
Since for our fixed x, these are [m] independent Bernoulli random variables, standard concentration
implies that with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m5/6)),
m∑
r=1
Λr(x,R/m
2/3) ≤ O(Rm5/6).
The fact that
∑m
r=1Ar ≤
∑m
r=1 Λr(x,R/m
2/3) finishes the proof of the claim.
We decompose f , using the following three functions
Definition A.4. We define f1, f2, f3 as follows:
f1(x) :=
m∑
r=1
a(0)r 〈∆Wr, x〉Ix,r
f2(x) :=
m∑
r=1
a(0)r (〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r )I(0)x,r
f3(x) :=
m∑
r=1
a(0)r (〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r )(Ix,r − I(0)x,r)
It is easy to see that f(x) = f1(x) + f2(x) + f3(x). We proceed by showing that |f1(x) −
g(x)|, |f2(x)| and |f3(x)| are all small.
Claim A.5. With probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m5/6)),
|f1(x)− g(x)| ≤ O(R2/m1/6)
Proof. From the definition of Ar we have that |Ix,r − I(0)x,r| ≤ Ar.
|f1(x)− g(x)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
r=1
ar〈∆Wr, x〉(Ix,r − I(0)x,r)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
m∑
r=1
|ar| · |〈∆Wr, x〉| ·Ar
≤ R
m
m∑
r=1
Ar
The last step follows from ‖∆W‖2,∞ ≤ Rm2/3 , ar ∼ {± 1m1/3 }. From Claim A.3, with probability at
least 1− exp(−Ω(m5/6)),
|f1(x)− g(x)| ≤ O(R2/m1/6)
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Claim A.6. With probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m1/3)),
|f2(x)| ≤ O(1/m1/6)
Proof. From the definition of f2,
f2(x) =
m∑
r=1
a(0)r σ(〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ).
By definition of the ReLU function σ(·),
m∑
r=1
σ2(〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ) ≤
m∑
r=1
(〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r )2
Also, note that for r ∈ [m], 〈W (0)r , x〉 + b(0)r ∼ N (0, 2/m) and independent. From concentration
of the sum of independent Chi-Square random variables, we have that with probability at least
1− exp(−Ω(m)),
m∑
r=1
σ2(〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ) ≤
m∑
r=1
(〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r )2 (5)
= O(1) (6)
Now, because of independence, using Hoeffding’s concentration inequality, for some large constant
c > 0,
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
r=1
a(0)r σ(〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r )
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ cm1/6
∣∣∣∣∣ W (0), b(0)
]
≤ exp
−Ω
 m−1/3
1
m2/3
∑m
r=1 σ
2
(
〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r
)

and using the previous bound we get that overall, with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m1/3)),
|f2(x)| ≤ O(1/m1/6)
Claim A.7. With probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m5/6)),
|f3(x)| ≤ O(R2/m1/6)
Proof.
|f3(x)| =
∣∣∣ m∑
r=1
a(0)r (〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r )(Ix,r − I(0)x,r)
∣∣∣
≤
m∑
r=1
|a(0)r |
∣∣∣〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Ix,r − I(0)x,r∣∣∣
≤ 1
m1/3
m∑
r=1
∣∣∣〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Ix,r − I(0)x,r∣∣∣
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We use that ∣∣∣Ix,r − I(0)x,r∣∣∣ ≤ Ar ≤ Λr(x,R/m2/3).
Now, remember that Λr(x,R/m2/3) 6= 0 ⇐⇒
∣∣∣〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ∣∣∣ ≤ R/m2/3, so∣∣∣〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Ix,r − I(0)x,r∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ∣∣∣Λr(x,R/m2/3) ≤ Rm2/3 Λr(x,R/m2/3)
Thus,
|f3(x)| ≤ R
m
m∑
r=1
Λr(x,R/m
2/3).
But, as we previously showed, with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m5/6)),
m∑
r=1
Λr(x,R/m
2/3) ≤ O(Rm5/6).
Thus, with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m5/6)),
|f3(x)| = O(R2/m1/6).
We are ready to finish the proof of the lemma 4. Aggregating these three claims with a union
bound, we have that for every x ∈ X , with probability at least 1−exp(−Ω(m5/6))−exp(−Ω(m1/3)) =
1− exp(−Ω(m1/3)), we have
|f(x)− g(x)| ≤ |f1(x)− g(x)|+ |f2(x)|+ |f3(x)| ≤ O(R2/m1/6) (7)
What is left to do is to "union bound" over all X . Of course, there is the problem that X is
uncountable. So, we first do a union bound over a very fine-grained net of X and then argue about
the change of f and g when we slightly change the input x.
Let X1 be a maximal 1m -net of X . It is well-known that |X1| ≤
(
1
m
)O(d). From lemma 4, by
applying a union bound over X1, we have that for m ≥ cd3, where c is a large constant, with
probability at least
1− exp(O(d logm)) · exp(−Ω(m1/3)) = 1− exp(−Ω(m1/3)),
we have
∀x ∈ X1, |f(x)− g(x)| ≤ O(R2/m1/6) (8)
The final step is the perturbation analysis. We show the following lemma, that applies for fixed
inputs.
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Lemma A.8. For all x ∈ X1, with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m1/2)), for all v ∈ Rd, such that
x+ v ∈ X and ‖v‖2 ≤ 1m , we have
|f(x+ v)− f(x)| ≤ O(1/m1/3 +R/m) (9)
and
|g(x+ v)− g(x)| ≤ O(R/m1/2). (10)
With this lemma at hand, we can do a union bound over X1 and conclude that with probability
at least 1 − exp(O(d logm)) exp (−Ω (m1/2)) = 1 − exp (−Ω (m1/2)) (since m ≥ cd3 and c is a
large constant), we have that for all x ∈ X1 and v ∈ Rd, such that x + v ∈ X and ‖v‖2 ≤ 1m , the
perturbation guarantees 9 and 10 hold. Combining this with 8 and applying a union bound, we
have that with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m1/3))− exp (−Ω (m1/2)) = 1− exp(−Ω(m1/3)),
‖f − g‖∞ ≤ O(R2/m1/6 + 1/m1/3 +R/m+R/m1/2) = O(R2/m1/6)
and this concludes the proof of theorem 5.1.
It remains to prove the Lemma A.8.
Let v be a small perturbation of x with the properties stated in the lemma, that can depend
arbitrarily on a(0),W (0), b(0).
|f(x+ v)− f(x)| =
∣∣∣ m∑
r=1
a(0)r
(
σ
(
〈W (0)r + ∆Wr, x+ v〉+ b(0)r
)
− σ
(
〈W (0)r + ∆Wr, x〉+ b(0)r
))∣∣∣
≤
m∑
r=1
|a(0)r |
∣∣∣〈W (0)r + ∆Wr, v〉∣∣∣
≤ 1
m
m∑
r=1
|a(0)r |‖W (0)r + ∆Wr‖2
=
1
m1+1/3
m∑
r=1
‖W (0)r + ∆Wr‖2
≤ 1
m4/3
m∑
r=1
‖W (0)r ‖2 +
1
m4/3
m∑
r=1
‖∆Wr‖2
≤ 1
m4/3
m∑
r=1
‖W (0)r ‖2 +
R
m
We show the following claim, which concludes the proof of 9.
Claim A.9. With probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m)), ‖W (0)‖2,∞ ≤ O(1).
Proof. From concentration of sum of independent Chi-Square random variables, we have that for
all r, with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m2/d)), ‖W (0)r ‖22 ≤ O(1). Since m ≥ d, a union bound
over all r finishes the proof of the claim.
We now argue about g.
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|g(x+ v)− g(x)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
r=1
a(0)r 〈∆Wr, x+ v〉1{〈W (0)r , x+ v〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0} −
m∑
r=1
a(0)r 〈∆Wr, x〉1{〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0}
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
m
m∑
r=1
|a(0)r |‖∆Wr‖2 +
m∑
r=1
|a(0)r | |〈∆Wr, x〉|
∣∣1{〈W (0)r , x+ v〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0} − 1{〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0}∣∣
≤ R
m
+
R
m
m∑
r=1
∣∣∣1{〈W (0)r , x+ v〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0} − 1{〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0}∣∣∣.
About the last sum, from Claim A.9, ‖W (0)‖2,∞ ≤ O(1) and in this case,
m∑
r=1
∣∣∣1{〈W (0)r , x+ v〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0} − 1{〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0} ∣∣∣ ≤ m∑
r=1
Λr (x,O(1/m))
From Claim A.1, we have that Λr(x,O(1/m)) = 1 with probability at most O
(
1
m1/2
)
. Since x is
fixed, these are m independent Bernoulli random variables and from standard concentration, with
probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(√m)),
m∑
r=1
Λr(x,O(1/m)) ≤ O(
√
m).
This finishes the proof of 10.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2
Proof. We will give the values of T and η, later in the proof. For simplicity, we use the following
shorthand notations to denote various distances.
Dmax := maxt∈[T ] ‖W (t) −W (0)‖2,∞
DW ∗ := ‖W ∗ −W (0)‖2,∞
By condition, we know DW ∗ = O
(
R
m2/3
)
.
Even though in Algorithm 1 the parameters W are updated using the gradients of the real net,
in this proof we consider the pseudo-net as the object being optimized. Thus we need to relate
the real net gradients to the pseudo-net gradients. For ease of presentation, we define the following
convenient notations for the two notions of gradients:
real net gradient ∇(t) := ∇WL(f(W (t)), S(t))
pseudo-net gradient ∇̂(t) := ∇WL(g(W (t)), S(t))
We write both gradients as matrices in Rd×m In fact, by Lemma A.10, we know that they are
coupled with high probability, as long as W (t) stays close to initialization (i.e., Dmax ≤ m−15/24).
‖∇̂(t) −∇(t)‖2,1 ≤ O
(
nm13/24
)
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Remark. We assume for now Dmax ≤ m−15/24 is true and in the end we will set proper values for
T, η and m to make sure this is indeed the case.
Using the fact that the loss is 1-Lipschitz, we bound the gradient size:
‖∇(t)r ‖2 ≤ |ar|
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
σ′
(
〈W (t)r , xi〉+ b(0)r
)
‖x˜i‖2
)
≤ 1
m1/3
(11)
Due to the linearity of g with respect to W , the loss L(g(W ), S) is convex in W . For two
matrices A,B with the same dimensions, we write their inner product as 〈A,B, :〉 = tr(ATB).
L(g(W (t)), S(t))− L(g(W ∗), S(t))
≤ 〈∇(t),W (t) −W ∗〉+ 〈∇̂(t) −∇(t),W (t) −W ∗〉
≤ 〈∇(t),W (t) −W ∗〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=α(t)
+ ‖∇̂(t) −∇(t)‖2,1‖W (t) −W ∗‖2,∞︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=β(t)
We deal with a(t) and b(t) terms separately. As for the former, we use the standard online gradient
descent proof technique:
‖W (t+1) −W ∗‖2F = ‖W (t) − η∇(t) −W ∗‖2F = ‖W (t) −W ∗‖2F − 2ηα(t) + η2‖∇(t)‖2F
So, by rearranging we get
α(t) ≤ η
2
‖∇(t)‖2F +
‖W (t) −W ∗‖2F − ‖W (t+1) −W ∗‖2F
2η
and then sum over t,
T∑
t=1
α(t) ≤ η
2
T∑
t=1
‖∇(t)‖2F +
‖W (0) −W ∗‖2F − ‖W (T+1) −W ∗‖2F
2η
≤ ηm
1/3
2
T +
mD2W ∗
2η
where we used the fact ‖W ∗ − W (0)‖2F ≤ m · ‖W ∗ − W (0)‖2,∞ = mD2W ∗ as well as ‖∇(t)‖2F ≤∑m
r=1 ‖∇(t)r ‖22 ≤ m1/3.
For the β(t)’s, we first invoke Lemma A.10 and then apply triangle inequality:
β(t) ≤ O
(
nm13/24
)
‖W (t) −W ∗‖2,∞ ≤ O
(
nm13/24
)
(Dmax +DW ∗)
Furthermore we can bound the size of Dmax using the bound on gradients, i.e. ‖∇(t)r ‖2 ≤ m−1/3
using inequality 11.
Dmax = max
t∈[T ]
‖W (0) −W (t)‖2,∞ ≤
T∑
t=1
η max
r∈[m]
‖∇(t)r ‖2 ≤
ηT
m1/3
Putting it together with the condition DW∗ = O
(
R
m2/3
)
that we already have, we obtain the
following:
T∑
t=1
L(g(W (t)), S(t))−
T∑
t=1
L(g(W ∗), S(t))
≤
T∑
t=1
α(t) +
T∑
t=1
β(t)
≤ O(1)
(
m1/3ηT +
R2
m1/3η
+ ηTnm5/24 +
ηRTn
m1/8
)
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We then have
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(g(W (t)), S(t))− 1
T
T∑
t=1
L(g(W ∗), S(t)) ≤ O()
if we set the hyper-parameters T,m, η to be the following:
T = Θ(−2R2),
m ≥ Ω
(
max
{
n8,
(
Rn

)24/11
,
(
R2

)24})
,
η = R
m1/3
√
T
= Θ(m−1/3)
Note the the requirement on m is to satisfy ηTnm1/4 + ηRTn
m1/12
≤ O(), Dmax ≤ m−15/24 as well as
to meet the condition for invoking Theorem 5.1:
∀t ∈ [T ], sup
x∈X
|fW (t)(x)− gW (t)(x)| ≤ O()
Thus, we get
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(fW (t) , S(t))−
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(fW ∗ , S(t)) ≤ c · 
where c > 0 is a large constant. Now, observe that L(fW (t) , S(t)) = LA(fW (t)) and L(fW ∗ , S(t)) ≤
LA∗(fW ∗). The proof we presented holds for all  > 0, so by using c in place of , we get the desired
result.
A.3 Gradient coupling
Lemma A.10. With probability at least 1 − exp(−Ω(m1/3)), for all iterations t that ‖W (t) −
W (0)‖2,∞ ≤ O
(
m−15/24
)
, we have
‖∇̂(t) −∇(t)‖2,1 ≤ O
(
nm13/24
)
Proof. We first prove the following claim.
Claim A.11. With probability probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m1/3)) over the initialization, for all
subsets {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ X with n points and any ‖∆Wr‖2 ≤ m−15/24,
m∑
r=1
1
{
∃i ∈ [n], sgn
(
〈W (0)r + ∆Wr, xi〉+ b(0)r
)
6= sgn
(
〈W (0)r , xi〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0
)}
≤ O
(
nm7/8
)
Proof. We first prove the above result for a fixed set of n points, and then apply a union bound
over all possible such sets. For a fixed set of n points {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ X , we define
Br := 1
{
∃i ∈ [n], sgn
(
〈W (t)r , xi〉+ b(0)r
)
6= sgn
(
〈W (0)r , xi〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0
)}
and the goal is to bound the size of
∑m
r=1Br.
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We know by Claim A.1 that for each xi we have
Pr
[
|〈W 0r , xi〉+ b(0)r | ≤ m−15/24
]
≤ O
(
m−1/8
)
With a union bound over the indices i ∈ [n], we have
Pr
[
∃i ∈ [n], |〈W 0r , xi〉+ b(0)r | ≤ m−15/24
]
≤ O
(
nm−1/8
)
which implies
Pr [Br = 1] ≤ Pr
[
∃i ∈ [n], |〈W 0r , xi〉+ b(0)r | ≤ m−15/24
]
≤ O
(
nm−1/8
)
Because xi’s are fixed for now, Br’s are m independent Bernoulli random variables. Standard
concentration implies that with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(nm7/8))
m∑
r=1
Br ≤ O
(
nm7/8
)
As a last step, we take a union bound over a 1m -net over product space ⊗nX which amplifies
the failure probability negligibly by only exp(O(nd logm)) compared to exp(−Ω(m1/3)) (for large
enough m).
Now, we are ready to finish the proof of the coupling lemma. Remember that Dmax = ‖W (t) −
W (0)‖2,∞. By Claim A.11, with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m1/3)), all t,
m∑
r=1
1
{
∇(t)r = ∇̂(t)r
}
≤ O
(
nm7/8
)
For the indices r’s that ∇(t)r 6= ∇̂(t)r , we have
‖∇̂(t)r −∇(t)r ‖2 ≤ |ar|
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣1{〈W (t)r , x˜i〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0} − 1{〈W (0)r , xi〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0}∣∣∣ ‖x˜i‖2
≤ 1
m1/3
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣1{〈W (t)r , x˜i〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0} − 1{〈W (0)r , xi〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0}∣∣∣
≤ 1
m1/3
Thus, we conclude
‖∇̂(t) −∇(t)‖2,1 =
m∑
r=1
‖∇̂(t)r −∇(t)r ‖2 ≤
1
m1/3
·O
(
nm7/8
)
= O
(
nm13/24
)
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A.4 Proof of lemma 6.4
Let
pk(z) := z
k∑
i=0
(1− z2)i
i∏
j=1
2j − 1
2j
(12)
Lemma A.12 (Corollary 5.4 in Frostig et al. [2016]). If z ∈ [−1, 1] with |z| ≥ η > 0 and k =
1
η2
ln (2/1), then | sgn(z)− pk(z)| ≤ 1/2. Moreover, pk has degree 2k + 1.
We will now compress pk using Chebyshev polynomials. Recall that the Chebyshev polynomials
of the first kind are defined as T0(z) = 1, T1(z) = z and
Tk+1(z) = zTk(z)− Tk−1(z) (13)
The definition is also extended for negative k as T−k(z) = Tk(z).
We will use the closed-form formula of Tk(z):
Tk(z) =
bn/2c∑
i=0
(
n
2i
)
(z2 − 1)izk−2i (14)
We bound the magnitude of the coefficients of the Chebyshev polynomials via the following
proposition.
Proposition A.13. The magnitude of the coefficients of Tk(z) is at most 22k.
Proof. From the closed-form formula in 14, we have that
Tk(z) =
bk/2c∑
i=0
(
k
2i
) i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
z2j(−1)i−jzk−2i =
bk/2c∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
k
2i
)(
i
j
)
(−1)i−jzk+2j−2i
The monomials that appear in the above polynomial are the zk−2u, for u = 0, . . . , bk/2c. The
magnitude of the coefficient of zk−2u is at most
∣∣∣∣∣∣
bk/2c∑
i=u
(
k
2i
)(
i
i− u
)
(−1)u
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
bk/2c∑
i=u
(
k
2i
)(
i
u
)
≤
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)(
k
bk/2c
)
≤ 22k
Now, let s be a positive integer, Y1, . . . , Ys iid ±1 random variables and Ds :=
∑s
i=1 Yi. Also,
let D ≥ 0. We define
ps,D(z) := EY1,...,Ys [TDs(z)1{|Ds| ≤ D}] (15)
A straightforward consequence of the proposition A.13 is the following corollary.
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Corollary A.14. ps,D(z) has degree at most D and its coefficients have magnitude at most 22D.
We will use the following theorem from Sachdeva et al. [2014].
Theorem A.15 (Theorem 3.3 from Sachdeva et al. [2014]). For all positive integers s,D and for
all z ∈ [−1, 1],
|ps,D(z)− zs| ≤ 2e−D2/(2s) (16)
Now, we are ready to compress pk. Let p˜k(z) :=
∑k
i=0 z
(∏i
j=1
2j−1
2j
)
pi,D(1 − z2). Also, let
D =
√
2k ln(4k/1).
From the above theorem, we have that for all z ∈ [−1, 1],
|p˜k(z)− pk(z)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
i=0
z
 i∏
j=1
2j − 1
2j
(pi,D(1− z2)− (1− z2)i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
k∑
i=0
∣∣pi,D(1− z2)− (1− z2)i∣∣
(17)
≤
k∑
i=0
2e−D
2/(2i) ≤ 1/2 (18)
Combining with lemma A.12, we get that for k = 1
η2
ln(2/1), for all z ∈ [−1, 1], | sgn(z) −
p˜k(z)| ≤ 1. Let p(z) := p˜k(z). We already know that the degree of p(z) is at most D =
1
η
√
2 ln(2/1) ln
(
4 ln(2/1)
η21
)
≤ 3η ln(2/(η1)).
It remains to bound the magnitude of its coefficients. Let pi,D(z) =
∑D
j=0 αjz
j . From Corol-
lary A.14, we have that αmax := maxj |αj | ≤ 22D. Now,
pi,D(1− z2) =
D∑
j=0
αj(1− z2)j =
D∑
j=0
αj
j∑
u=0
(
j
u
)
(−1)uz2u
The magnitude of the coefficient of z2u is at most (D + 1) · αmax ·
(
D
u
) ≤ (D + 1)23D ≤ 24D, since
D ≥ 1.4.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 6.5
We will first prove that we can approximate the individual components of f∗ via pseudo-networks
and then we aggregate these to form a large pseudo-network that approximates f∗.
Lemma A.16. Let i ∈ [n], q : R → R univariate polynomial and 3 ∈
(
0, 1C(q)
)
. Let m˜ ≥
c1
d
23
C2(q, 3), for a large constant c1. For all r ∈ [m˜], U (0)r ∼ N (0, Id), β(0)r ∼ N (0, 1), α(0)r ∼
unif{± 1
m1/3
} and all these random variables and vectors are independent. With probability at least
1 − exp
(
−Ω
(√
m˜
))
, there exists a matrix ∆W (i) ∈ Rd×m˜ with ‖∆W (i)‖2,∞ ≤ O
(
m1/3 C(q,3)m˜
)
such that
∀x ∈ X ,∣∣∣∣∣
m˜∑
r=1
α(0)r 〈∆W (i)r , x〉1{〈U (0)r , x〉+ β(0)r ≥ 0} − yiq(〈xi, x〉)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 33
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With this Lemma at hand, we can finish the proof of Lemma 6.5. We apply it for all i ∈ [n],
with q(z) being the polynomial that is given to us by Lemma 6.2. We now that the degree of q is
at most D and the size of its coefficients is at most c2 1γ 2
6D where D = 24γ ln(48n/) and c2 > 0
is a constant. Using this information about q, we can bound its complexities C(q) and C (q, 3),
defined in 6.1, where 3 will be set after we bound C(q) (since from Lemma A.16 3 < 1/C(q)).
About C(q), we directly have C(q) ≤ c · c2
∑D
j=0(j + 1)
1.75 1
γ 2
6D < c · c2 (D+1)
2.75
γ 2
6D. We set
3 =
(
c · c2 (D+1)
2.75
γ 2
6D
)−1
. About C (q, 3), we have
C (q, 3) ≤ c2
D∑
j=0
cj
(
1 +
√
ln(1/3)/j
)j 1
γ
24D
≤ O(1) 1
γ
24D(D + 1)cDe
√
D ln 1/3
= O(1)
1
γ
24D(D + 1)cDe
√
D ln
(
c·c2 (D+1)2.75γ 24D
)
≤ 2O(D) (19)
We specify now how we are performing the n applications of the lemma, in terms of the choice of m˜
and the random variables. Let B˜ := dc1 d23C
2(q, 3)e. We use the fact that for large enough constant c,
m ≥ d (n )c/γ ≥ nB˜. For i = 1, · · · , n−1 we apply the lemma A.16 with m˜ = bmn c and for i = n with
m˜ = m−(n−1)bmn c. Also, for the application of the lemma for the ith datapoint, we use as U
(0)
r the√
mW
(0)
(i−1)bm
n
c+r, as β
(0)
r the
√
mb
(0)
(i−1)bm
n
c+r and as α
(0)
r the a
(0)
(i−1)bm
n
c+r. We apply a union bound
and we have that with probability at least 1−n exp(−Ω(√m/n)) = 1−exp(−Ω(√m/n)), from the
n applications of the lemma, we get these ∆W (i) and we construct ∆W =
[
∆W (1), · · · ,∆W (n)] ∈
Rd×m and we have that
‖∆W‖2,∞ ≤ O
(
m1/3
C (q, 3)
bmn c
)
≤ O
(
n C (q, 3)
m2/3
)
≤ (n/)
O(γ−1)
m2/3
and
∀x ∈ X ,
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
r=1
a(0)r 〈∆Wr, x〉1{〈W (0)r , x〉+ b(0)r ≥ 0} −
n∑
i=1
yiq(〈xi, x〉)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ n3 ≤ /3
where the last inequality is a crude bound, but sufficient for our purposes.
We proceed with the proof of Lemma A.16
Proof. We apply Lemma 6.6 using φ(z) = yiq(z) and 1 = 3. Observe that since |yi| ≤ O(1), the
complexities of φ and q are the same, up to constants. Thus, we have that there exists a function
h : R2 → [−C (q, 3) ,C (q, 3)] such that
∀x ∈ X ,
∣∣∣ E
u∼N (0,Id),β∼N (0,1)
[1{〈u, x〉+ β ≥ 0} h(〈xi, u〉, β)]− yiq(〈xi, x〉)
∣∣∣ ≤ 3 (20)
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Now, we fix an x ∈ X . From Hoeffding’s inequality, we get that with probability at least 1 −
exp
(
−Ω
(
m˜23
C2(q,3)
))
,
∣∣∣∣∣ 1m˜
m˜∑
r=1
1{〈U (0)r , x〉+ β(0)r ≥ 0}h
(
〈xi, U (0)r 〉, β(0)r
)
− E
u∼N (0,Id),β∼N (0,1)
[1{〈u, x〉+ β ≥ 0} h(〈xi, u〉, β)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3
By setting ∆W (i)r = 1
α
(0)
r
2h
(
〈xi,U(0)r 〉,β(0)r
)
m˜ ed (where ed = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1) ∈ Rd) we have that ‖∆W (i)‖2,∞ ≤
O
(
m1/3 C(q,3)m˜
)
and since xd = 1/2 for all x ∈ X , we have that for every x ∈ X , with probability
at least 1− exp
(
−Ω
(
m˜23
C2(q,3)
))
,∣∣∣∣∣
m˜∑
r=1
1{〈U (0)r , x〉+ β(0)r ≥ 0}α(0)r 〈∆W (i)r , x〉 − E
u∼N (0,Id),β∼N (0,1)
[1{〈u, x〉+ β ≥ 0} h(〈xi, u〉, β)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3
(21)
The fact that 21 holds with overwhelming probability, enables us to take a union bound over a
fine-grained net of X . Let c > 0 be a sufficiently large constant (e.g. 10) and let X1 be a maximal
1
m˜c -net of X . It is well-known that |X1| ≤
(
1
m˜
)O(d). By applying a union bound over X1 for 21, we
have that for m˜ ≥ c1 d23C
2(q, 3)) (c1 is a large constant),
Pr
[
∀x ∈ X1,
∣∣∣∣∣
m˜∑
r=1
1{〈U (0)r , x〉+ β(0)r ≥ 0}α(0)r 〈∆W (i)r , x〉 (22)
− E
u∼N (0,Id),β∼N (0,1)
[1{〈u, x〉+ β ≥ 0} h(〈xi, u〉, β)]
∣∣∣∣∣ > 3
]
≤ exp (O(d logm)) exp
(
−Ω
(
m˜23
C2(q, 3)
))
(23)
= exp
(
−Ω
(
m˜23
C2(q, 3)
))
(24)
The final step is to show that with overwhelming probability, for all x ∈ X1, if we perturb x by
at most 1m˜c in `2, then the LHS of 21 changes very slightly. Because c can be chosen to be as large
constant as we want, this "stability" requirement is very mild and also straightforward to prove.
We proceed with a formal proof.
We will show the stability property for a fixed x ∈ X and then we will do a union bound.
Let v ∈ Rd such that x + v ∈ X and ‖v‖2 ≤ 1m˜c . This v can be arbitrarily correlated with the
randomness {U (0)r , β(0)r , α(0)r }m˜r=1. We will show the following claim
Claim A.17. For all x ∈ X1, with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(
√
m˜)),
D1 :=
∣∣∣∣∣
m˜∑
r=1
1{〈U (0)r , x+ v〉+ β(0)r ≥ 0}α(0)r 〈∆W (i)r , x+ v〉 −
m˜∑
r=1
1{〈U (0)r , x〉+ β(0)r ≥ 0}α(0)r 〈∆W (i)r , x〉
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ O
(
C (q, 3)√
m˜
)
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and
D2 :=
∣∣∣ E
u∼N (0,Id),β∼N (0,1)
[1{〈u, x+ v〉+ β ≥ 0} h(〈xi, u〉, β)]
− E
u∼N (0,Id),β∼N (0,1)
[1{〈u, x〉+ β ≥ 0} h(〈xi, u〉, β)]
∣∣∣
≤ O
(
C (q, 3)√
m˜
)
With this claim at hand we can finish the proof of the Lemma A.16. Indeed, combining 20, 22
and the above claim, we have that with probability at least 1−exp
(
−Ω
(
m˜23
C2(q,3)
))
−exp(−Ω(√m˜)),
∀x ∈ X ,∣∣∣∣∣
m˜∑
r=1
α(0)r 〈∆W (i)r , x〉1{〈U (0)r , x〉+ β(0)r ≥ 0} − yiq(〈xi, x〉)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O
(
C (q, 3)√
m˜
)
+ 23
since m˜ ≥ c1 d23C
2(q, 3) for a large constant c1, we are done.
It remains to prove the Claim A.17.
Proof. We start with bounding D1. Observe that from the way we constructed ∆W (i), we have
that for j ≤ d − 1, ∆W (i)rj = 0. At the same time, vd = 0, so 〈∆W (i)r , v〉 = 0. Using that
‖∆W (i)‖2,∞ ≤ O
(
m1/3 C(q,3)m˜
)
and |α(0)r | = 1m1/3 , we get that
D1 ≤ O
(
C (q, 3)
m˜
) m˜∑
r=1
∣∣∣1{〈U (0)r , x+ v〉+ β(0)r ≥ 0} − 1{〈U (0)r , x〉+ β(0)r ≥ 0}∣∣∣
≤ O
(
C (q, 3)
m˜
) m˜∑
r=1
1
{
sgn(〈U (0)r , x+ v〉+ β(0)r ) 6= sgn(〈U (0)r , x〉+ β(0)r )
}
≤ O
(
C (q, 3)
m˜
) m˜∑
r=1
(
1
{
|〈U (0)r , x〉+ β(0)r | ≤
1√
m˜
}
+ 1
{
‖U (0)r ‖2 > c2
√
m˜
})
.
where c2 can be chosen to be as large as we want (but still a constant) as long as we choose the
constant c, that appears at the construction of the net, to be sufficiently large. We prove the
following claim, whose proof is almost identical to the proof of Claim A.18, but we provide it for
completeness.
Claim A.18. With probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m˜)), for all r ∈ [m˜], ‖U (0)r ‖2 ≤ O(
√
m˜).
Proof. From concentration of sum of independent Chi-Square random variables, we have that for
all r, with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m˜2/d)), ‖U (0)r ‖22 ≤ O(m˜). Since m˜ ≥ d, a union bound
over all r finishes the proof of the claim.
Thus, by appropriately choosing c2, we get that with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(m˜)),
D1 ≤ O
(
C (q, 3)
m˜
) m˜∑
r=1
1
{
|〈U (0)r , x〉+ β(0)r | ≤
1√
m˜
}
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Now, 1
{
|〈U (0)r , x〉+ β(0)r | ≤ 1√
m˜
}
are m˜ independent Bernoulli random variables and because of
Claim A.1, the corresponding probability is at most O
(
1√
m˜
)
. Thus, from Chernoff bounds we get
that with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(√m˜)), ∑m˜r=1 1{|〈U (0)r , x〉+ β(0)r | ≤ 1√m˜} ≤ O(√m˜). By
applying a union bound, we get that with probability at least 1− exp(−Ω(√m˜))− exp(−Ω(m˜)) =
1− exp(−Ω(√m˜)), D1 ≤ O
(
C(q,3)√
m˜
)
.
We proceed with bounding D2. Since |h(·)| ≤ C (q, 3), we have
D2 ≤ C (q, 3) E
u∼N (0,Id),β∼N (0,1)
[|1{〈u, x+ v〉+ β ≥ 0} − 1{〈u, x〉+ β ≥ 0}|]
≤ C (q, 3) E
u∼N (0,Id),β∼N (0,1)
[
1{|〈u, x〉+ β| ≤ 1√
m˜
}+ 1{‖u‖2 > c2
√
m˜}
]
where c2 is the same constant as before. But, same as before, Pru∼N (0,Id),β∼N (0,1)
[
|〈u, x〉+ β| ≤ 1√
m˜
]
≤
O( 1√
m˜
) and Pru∼N (0,Id),β∼N (0,1)
[
‖u‖2 > c2
√
m˜
]
≤ exp(−Ω(m˜)). So, D2 ≤ O
(
C(q,3)√
m˜
)
.
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